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The Creative Moment of Scientific
Apprehension
Understanding the Consummation of Scientific Explanation through
Dewey and Peirce
Mark Dietrich Tschaepe
“In the light of the doctrine of categories I should
say that an object, to be esthetically good, must
have a multitude of parts so related to one another
as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to
their totality…” (EP 2: 201)
“I suppose anyone who knows Mr. Einstein at
present would say that he had quite as genuine
and esthetic an experience from his mathematical
calculations and their results that would mean
nothing to us as he does from playing his violin.”
(LW 13: 359)
1 When creativity is thought as a part of science, it is primarily considered as part of the
innovative process – perhaps as the Eureka! moment of Archimedes – before some sort of
scientific  process  takes  over  as  strictly  instrumental and  removed  from any  sort  of
experience  that  could  be  deemed aesthetic.  Even when the  processes  of  constructing
hypotheses and experiments are performed, these are rarely understood as creative in an
artistic  or  aesthetic  sense.  Scientific  experience and aesthetic  experience seem to be
antipodal.  The  former  too  often  thought  as  merely  consisting  of  mechanistic
propositions, considered objective and rooted in those shared respects of experience that
have been distilled of feeling for the sake of shared experimentation and reaching general
conclusions. Aesthetics being considered as the realm of feeling – the qualitative realm of
experience  –  that  is  regarded,  at  worst,  as  an  individualistic  hindrance  to  scientific
thought,  and,  at  best,  as  a  problematic  explanandum  for  which  we  need  scientific
explanans.
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2 Through  his  reconstructive  philosophy,  John  Dewey  facilitated  re-connecting  the
scientific  and  aesthetic  modes  of  experience.  He  realized  that  the  two  modes  of
experience were too often thought as mutually exclusive, pertaining only to objects that
were considered as if they were of two distinct natural kinds. In his work, he warned
against opposing science and aesthetic experience, whether through simply cleaving the
two, or through valuing one above the other.  He declared this opposition due to the
“separation of the instrumental and the consummatory,” and offered a corrective to this
separation  in  his  reconstruction  of  aesthetic  experience  as  that  which  ties  together
seemingly isolated fields of experience (LW 1: 290). As he states in his essay, “Aesthetic
Experience as Primary Phase”:
the  case  of  aesthetic  experience  with  its  cultivated  development  of  the  artistic
variety  out  of  what  is  natural  and spontaneous in  primary experience provides
what, in all probability, is the simplest and most direct way in which to lay hold of
what  is  fundamental  in  all  the  forms  of  experience  that  are  traditionally  (but
fallaciously)  regarded  as  so  many  different,  separate,  isolated,  independent
divisions of subject matter. (LW 16: 396)
3 In  the  following,  I  utilize  Dewey’s  work  that  re-connects  science  with  aesthetic
experience in order to argue that scientific products are also aesthetic objects, i.e. objects
that are part of our instrumental experience are also part of our aesthetic experience. As
a part of aesthetic experience, scientific explanations are creative objects both within and
outside of the proper domain of science. Specifically, I argue that scientific explanation,
as Dewey conceives of it,  is both instrumental and consummatory, and that when we
experience scientific  explanation in its  consummation,  this  is  what  I  deem a creative
moment of scientific apprehension. This moment is one at which Charles S. Peirce hints in his
Monist paper, “What Pragmatism Is” and is complemented by his categories of firstness
and secondness (EP 2). It is a moment not restricted to scientists or aesthetes, being a
moment  of  apprehension  that  occurs  in  everyday  experience  by  non-specialists.  By
combining Dewey’s conceptions of scientific explanation and aesthetic experience with
Peirce’s categories, an aspect of creativity regarding the products of scientific inquiry is
acknowledged and understood as an important part of our reasoning process.
4 In order to argue that scientific explanation is both instrumental and consummatory, I
first provide Dewey’s instrumental conception of scientific explanation, which includes
why science is  so often considered as separated from aesthetic experience.  Second,  I
present  a  general  overview  of  Dewey’s  conception  of  aesthetic  experience  and  the
common division conceived between scientific experience and that of aesthetics. Third, I
supply  reasons  to  reconsider  scientific  experience  as  having an aesthetic  dimension,
especially with regard to scientific explanations and the creative moment of scientific
apprehension. Finally, I discuss how recognition of this moment reveals an important
aspect of creative reasoning that is to be understood as a part of our experience through
what Peirce referred to as firstness and secondness.1
 
Scientific Explanation as Instrumental
5 John Dewey’s work has proven to be a source of tension regarding science and aesthetics.
Most Dewey scholars rightly object to any claims that Dewey is scientistic, and most agree
that  Dewey  places  importance  upon  both  scientific  inquiry  and  aesthetic  inquiry
throughout  his  work.  One  major  point  of  controversy,  as  indicated  by  James  Scott
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Johnston, has been “the proper role and scope of science in Dewey’s concept of inquiry”
(Johnston 2002: 1). Johnston has attempted to refute readings of Dewey as scientistic or
positivistic (e.g. H.O. Mounce 1997; Leonard Waks 1998), in part, by remarking on the
importance of aesthetic inquiry for Dewey, as well as the fact that the reach of aesthetic
inquiry extends far beyond that of scientific inquiry. My purpose here is not to argue
against  Johnston  or  other  Dewey  scholars  concerning  the  types  of  inquiry  or  the
extension of aesthetic inquiry versus that of scientific inquiry; however, these scholars
neglect and, at times, seemingly reject scientific products as part of aesthetic experience.
In contrast, scientific explanations are not only scientific, but are also objects that one
experiences  aesthetically  in  everyday  life.  This  is  an  important  aspect  of  scientific
explanation that becomes evident when we combine Dewey’s work on science with that
on aesthetics.  It  is  important  because  Dewey’s  inclusion  of  the  aesthetic  regarding
scientific  products,  such as  explanations,  provides a  dimension of  understanding the
process and products of scientific inquiry that are too often neglected in philosophical
analyses of science. This is especially true in the case of scientific explanation, wherein
most accounts leave aside the actual experience of the moment of having or getting an
explanation,  treating scientific  explanation as  if  it  is  something that  simply remains
within a separate ‘realm’ of scientific practice that is apart from our experience. Dewey’s
reconstruction of scientific experience provides an account of scientific explanation that
aids  in  re-connecting  the  secondary  experience  of  explanation  with  the  primary
experience  of  an explanation being had.  His  inclusion of  the  aesthetic  dimension of
experience is a fundamental part of this corrective reconstruction of scientific activity.
Dewey’s conception of aesthetics as applied to scientific practice indicates that scientific
explanation  is,  in  fact,  consummated  as  an  explanation  because  of  its  aesthetic
dimension.
6 All of scientific practice, as is the case with any of our practices, is born from and is
always part of experience.  Dewey defined experience generally as “what men do and
suffer, what they strive for, love, believe, endure, and also how men act and are acted
upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, and desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine”
(LW 1: 8). Experience is the process of living, and it pertains to every type of interaction
between  the  organism  and  its  environment,  including  productive,  discursive,  and
consummatory  interactions  (LW 12:  74).  From and  within  experience,  we  engage  in
scientific  processes  when  we  are attempting  to  solve  problems  that  pertain  to  the
conditions of  experience  (LW  10:  211).  Through  the  process  of  scientific  inquiry,  we
transform  our  immediate  experience,  utilizing  the  sub-processes  of  analysis  and
synthesis. Analysis is the process of discrimination by which experience is pieced into
particular objects, and synthesis is the process of identification wherein the objects of
experience are re-unified as a whole (LW 8: 275). Experience is analyzed into data, which
is the discernible material of our experience divided into distinct parts in our attempt to
understand the conditions of experience, i.e. how or why a problem has or will or might
possibly take place.  This data is synthesized into ideas,  which are the suggestions or
possible solutions that are to be used to solve the questions addressing those conditions
(LW 8: 197-198). This process signifies one of Dewey’s most important distinctions within
experience:  that  of  primary and secondary experience. Primary experience is  simply
experiencing without analysis or synthesis. Most of our experience is merely primary,
and most unproblematic primary experience goes unquestioned. Secondary experience is
that which has been systematically analyzed and synthesized. It is that experience by
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which we attempt to understand primary experience. Analysis provides us with scientific
products  within  secondary  experience  that  are  applied  to  primary  experience  in
answering  questions  concerning  experience.  Scientific  explanation  is  one  type  of
scientific  product  created  in  this  process.  The  explanations  constructed  from  our
secondary experience are tested against  what we have questioned regarding primary
experience (LW 1: 15-16). Thus, scientific explanations are the result of our inquiries into
experience, and thereby become part of our experience, even when we are not engaged in
scientific inquiry.
7 For Dewey, scientific explanation is a type of operation that is to be derived from a set of
cases  produced  and  analyzed  (LW  12:  275).  The  explanation  is  applied  to  specific
situations  through  the  process  of  experimentation,  testing  whether  or  not  the
explanation actually solves the problem being addressed at the level of the conditions of
experience.  An explanation thereby provides a solution,  or guide to a solution,  for a
problem or question regarding the conditions of experience. Scientific explanations are
based upon a series of experiments, including the hypotheses that direct experiments,
and  through  the  conceptualization  of  the  secondary  experience  of  experimentation,
scientific objects such as explanations are applied to primary experience.
8 The  process  of  experimentation  and  explanation-generation  is  rife  with  creative
processes, including abduction, the process of creating a probable solution to a problem,
as  Peirce  conceived of  it  (Anderson 1987:  15).  However,  Peirce also hints  at  another
creative process within the process of experimentation; one on which he never elaborates
as a moment of creativity. This moment occurs between the sixth and seventh stage of
experiment that he describes in his essay, “What Pragmatism Is” (EP 2: 339-40). Here he
states that following the actual actions of the experiment, there “comes the subsequent
reaction of the world upon the experimenter in a perception; and finally, his recognition
of  the  teaching  of  the  experiment”  (EP  2:  340).  Peirce’s  use  of  the  term recognition
indicates a re-cognizing, or what Dewey would call synthesis. However, Peirce’s use of
reaction and perception in  the moment  before recognition indicate  awareness  without
secondary cognition; a felt quality had by the experimenter as the experiment comes to a
close.  There  is  an  immediately  grasped  qualitative  dimension  of  the  experience  of
experimentation that accompanies the formulation of the solution to the question that
drives the experiment, i.e. which consummates the experience.
9 As Dewey rightly noted,  scientific processes typically ignore the immediately grasped
qualitative dimension of experience (LW 5: 243). Peter Godfrey-Smith has remarked that
Dewey’s philosophy of science accounts for the neglect of the aesthetic by pointing to the
instrumentalist practices of science. Most scientific practices merely involve “relations,
potentialities,  and  interactions”  (Godfrey-Smith  2002:  S32).  Dewey  understood  that
“Scientific  thought  is,  in  its  turn,  a  specialized form of  art,  with its  own qualitative
control,” but that most people do not realize or acknowledge the qualitative and artistic
nature of  scientific  practices (LW 5:  252).  He reasoned that the failure to realize the
immediate qualitative nature of formal scientific construction had two primary causes.
The first was the common limited “habit of associating art and aesthetic appreciation
with a few popularly recognized forms,” while the second “is the fact that a student is so
concerned with the mastery of symbolic or propositional forms that he fails to recognize
and to repeat the creative operations involved in their construction” (LW 5: 242). This
second  reason  I  here  expand  to  include  anyone  who  is  presented  with  scientific
explanations.  Science  is  primarily  not included  in  the  realms  of  art  and  aesthetic
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appreciation,  instead  being  considered  completely  instrumental  and  actively  anti-
aesthetic. In addition, we are typically not considered to be creating when being receptive
to a scientific explanation. This mistakenly is thought of as a passive process. In fact,
when we inquire and consider an explanation,  this  is  an active process in which we
actually engage. Similar to what Peirce stated concerning the process of experimentation,
a reaction of the explanation upon the inquirer is a perception, and this is followed by the
inquirer’s recognition of what the explanation explains. For Peirce, “all of experience is ‘a
consciousness of reaction’” (Short 2007: 77) When a scientific explanation is presented,
the inquirer both feels it and reacts to it, and this is not merely an instrumental activity,
but can also be an aesthetic experience.
 
Scientific Explanation Cleaved from Aesthetic
Experience
10 The aesthetic  is  a  forgotten world in which the scientific  resides.  Godfrey-Smith has
stated, “for Dewey science is the disinterested study of instrumentality in nature,” and this is
the case for most of the “decisions made within science” (S32).2 However, the scientific
explanations that are constructed from within science are not only instrumental, but, as
Dewey indicated,  they are  also  able  to  be  experienced as  aesthetic.  Neither  of  these
experiences is somehow exclusive from the other, nor are they exclusive from the rest of
our experience.
11 The aesthetic is that which has immediately enjoyed intrinsic meaning (LW 1: 271). In this
manner, it is in direct contrast to the scientific processes of analysis and synthesis, which
are the mediation of meaning. The latter entail discerning or ‘figuring out’ the meaning
of a situation, and, in that respect, the situation is incomplete, i.e. unconsummated. In his
work on Dewey’s aesthetics, Van Meter Ames remarked, “The unaesthetic then is the
slack, the loose, the confused, the lack of balance between doing and receiving” (Ames
1953: 146). This is the instrumental side of the scientific, which is a search for something
apart from the experience being had. In fact,  we often engage in scientific practices,
including inquiring about and engaging with scientific explanations, in order to remove
ourselves from our present experience; to effectively create a way out of our current,
problematic, situation. An instrumental experience is open and incomplete. By its very
nature as instrumental, it signifies seeking something to complete the experience.
12 According  to  Dewey,  “every  normally  complete  experience,  every  one  that  runs  its
course, is aesthetic in its consummatory phase…” (LW 16: 395). The aesthetic is then not
isolated to what we often take to be artistic, but pertains to all complete experiences –
those which we can legitimately call  an experience.  As Richard Bernstein has stated:
“Anything  which  is  distinctly  an  experience,  i.e.  a  situation  which  has  a  unity  and
wholeness of its own, has aesthetic quality” (Bernstein 1961: 8). In Experience and Nature,
Dewey discusses the common conflation of the artistic and the aesthetic.  The artistic
pertains  to  those  actions  that  manipulate  a  situation  from  an  incomplete  or
unsatisfactory state to a state that is complete and satisfying. The aesthetic does not
pertain  to  the  actual  artistic  processes  that  complete  the  formerly  incomplete  or
unsatisfying state, but rather, it pertains to “an enancement of the receptive appreciation
and assimilation of objects” within the completed, satisfying state (LW 1: 267). Dewey
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continues that science is an art that aids in bringing about what he calls “the complete
culmination of nature” and the union between the artistic and the aesthetic (LW 1: 268-9).
13 The qualities of an experience are immediate, and when the immediate grasp of qualities
is of an experience that is complete and at its fullest, then that experience is aesthetic.
Most often, aesthetic experience is mistakenly thought to be had only in the midst of
what are considered ‘art objects’ or ‘fine art.’ Dewey fought tirelessly against this dualism
imposed between ‘fine art’ and life. This included the artificial separation between what
are considered to be ‘the arts’ and ‘the sciences.’ As Casey Haskins has indicated, Dewey
rejected the Kantian argument that the products of  art  and science come from “two
transcendentally distinct forms of mental activity,” arguing instead that they emerge
“from  intelligence’s  more  general  impulse  of  striving  for  increasingly  developed
experience through a transformation of the world in which it finds itself” (Haskins 1992:
230). In the same regard that both are created from the same intelligent source, neither
are they necessarily divided in how they are experienced. Just as the art product is often
analyzed and synthesized, the scientific product is aesthetically experienced.
 
Apprehending the Consummation of Scientific
Explanation
14 An aesthetic experience consists of the culmination of all  of our emotion, awareness,
inquiry, and interest in its immediacy. This is experienced often through films, musical
pieces,  sculptures,  and paintings,  i.e.  objects  of  art  or  the ‘fine arts.’  As  James Scott
Johnston  has  indicated,  Dewey  placed  a  great  emphasis  on  inquiry  within  the
consummatory aesthetic experience. In his own investigation of the role of inquiry in the
aesthetic experience, Johnston states that aesthetic reflection occurs “in the immediacy
of the experience undergone, rather than in the realm of language” (Johnston 2002: 10).
Johnston rightly notes that scientific method can become akin to an aesthetic object,
although he restricts  this  to science only when “the act  of  discovery,  of  creation,  is
privileged” (Johnston 2002: 11). His exclusive categorization of science as aesthetic being
conditional  upon science only when it  turns to discovery or creation stems from the
separation that  Johnston detects  between the immediacy of  creation,  and the logical
detachment of science as “the inquiry of statement,” which is necessarily “removed from
the immediacy of awareness necessary as a quality for any consummatory experience”
(Johnston 2002: 11). Here I believe that Johnston is too restrictive in his account of science
as it is presented by Dewey, overstressing the remark that “… there is an unbridgeable
gap between science  in  the  laboratory  and the  work of  art”  (LW 10:  126;  quoted in
Johnston 2002: 11). Johnston proclaims that:
An aesthetic object is generally able to evoke a far wider-ranging set of responses in
a far wider-ranging set  or group of people than a bald scientific  statement.  […]
Inquiry in an aesthetic experience functions as a more complete inquiry. It helps to
fuse  all  of  the  ingredients  necessary  for  a  consummatory  experience  into  one
cohesive, immediate whole, whereas inquiry in a scientific experiment or logical
understanding  often  contents  itself  to  dwell  in  the  explanatory  realm  alone.
(Johnston 2002: 12)
15 Johnston  undermines  the  potential  aesthetic  experience  of  scientific  explanations
without questioning what the aesthetic dimension of such a scientific product might be.
Although he has acknowledged the aesthetic dimension of science when it is focused on
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discovery or creation,  the consummatory phase of  scientific  explanation – the actual
explanation  itself  –  has  been  neglected  prima  facie.  By  reassessing  Dewey’s  work
concerning  scientific  products  and  aesthetic  experience,  we  find  that  scientific
explanations are actually objects that bring an important aesthetic dimension to our
experience.
16 Qualitative experience includes scientific thinking, thereby including products of science,
such  as  scientific  explanations  (LW 5:  261-2).  Perhaps  the  most  common  qualitative
experience had pertaining to science is  that  of  felt  difficulty,  which is  the immediate
feeling that launches us into scientific inquiry. “The problem is had or experienced before
it can be stated or set forth; but it is had as an immediate quality of the whole situation.
The sense of something problematic, of something perplexing and to be resolved, marks
the presence of something pervading all elements and considerations” (LW 5: 249). This is
the qualitative experience at the inception of scientific inquiry, and just as there is a
feeling of “something pervading all elements and considerations” as the problem, there is
also  the  qualitative  experience  of  the  solution,  i.e.  qualitatively  experiencing  the
explanation of the problem. As a solution, scientific explanation is often qualitatively
experienced through what  Mark Girod has  deemed aesthetic  understanding,  a  concept
inspired by Dewey. Aesthetic understanding is defined as “a rich network of conceptual
knowledge combined with a deep appreciation for the beauty and power of ideas that
literally transform one’s experiences and perceptions of the world” (Pugh and Girod 2007:
12).  Utilizing  this  conception  of  aesthetic  understanding  as  an  epistemic  network
ingrained with an appreciation for what Peirce referred to as kalos – a generalized sense
of harmony –,  scientific explanations are those qualitative and epistemic objects that
elegantly  fit where  our  felt  difficulty  was  (Hocutt  1962:  160).  The  explanation,  as  a
totality, is felt aesthetically as what Peirce called “a positive immediate quality” (EP 2:
201). We do not only comprehend explanations, understanding them indirectly through a
mediated process. There are also moments when we apprehend scientific explanations –
grasping their meaning directly— in our immediate engagement with them.
17 As  a  construction,  scientific  explanation is  created  over  a  period  of  time  through a
process of inquiry that is removed from the aesthetic. Again, most of scientific inquiry,
following the  initial  felt  difficulty,  is  mediated,  but  the  artistry  of  scientific  method
sometimes  ends  in  a  completed,  finished  product:  a  scientific  explanation  that  fully
explains the  problem  that  launched  the  inquiry.  Dewey’s  conception  of  scientific
explanation, combined with his conception of aesthetic experience, provide us with a way
in which we can understand how our explanations sometimes simply feel as if they fit at
the moment in which we receive them. The very process of apprehending the explanation
consummates the experience,  and it  is  an aesthetic experience in which we are fully
absorbed. This is a rare moment in which science not only “states meaning,” but fulfills
the common role of  art:  it  also expresses those meanings (LW 10:  90).  The scientific
explanation becomes both an expression and a statement. Although it is a generalized
statement  as  a  part  of  intellectual  experience,  it  is  also  an  expressive  object  in  the
moment in which it is aesthetically experienced. Our engagement with the explanation
leads  to  our  experiencing  its  expression  and  the  achievement  of  kalos.  A  scientific
explanation  may  strike  us  suddenly  with  what  Dewey  referred  to  as  “tranquility  of
emotion and at the same time […] excitement” (LW 13, 368). The explanation fixes the
violent rupture brought to our experience through a felt difficulty.
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18 If the felt difficulty is the wound and ensuing infection that has “spread throughout the
entire situation,” then the explanation is the remedy that eradicates the infection (LW 8:
201). Our aesthetic experience of the explanation is that moment of consummation when
the infected situation has been cleansed and cauterized, and we are presented with a
clean bill  of health.  We feel the alleviation of our exigency.  Our situation is not only
remedied,  but  improved  upon.  Before  analyzing  and  comprehending  the  scientific
explanation, our aesthetic experience of it is that of a kind of panacea: the explanation
feels as if it cures our problem without reflective details or grueling, meditative steps, but
all at once, in one gesture. This is the creative moment of scientific apprehension, which is our
individual experience of the scientific explanation consummated and felt at its fullest. In
this moment we feel the full force of the scientific explanation as it answers our felt
difficulty. It is creative because we experience the immediate making of a solution; we are
swept in the process of making before mediation.
 
The Feeling and Resistance of Creative Apprehension
19 If,  as  Ignacio  Götz  states,  “creativity  is  the  process  or  activity  of  deliberately  concretizing
insight,” then this moment of apprehension is that very moment of insight; it is creativity
realized (Götz 1981:  300).  Peirce provides a terminology here to understand how this
moment contributes to the reasoning process.3 The quality of the explanation as it is
experienced is what Peirce called a First or its firstness. In “A Guess at the Riddle,” Peirce
defines  a  First  as  that  which  is  “present  and  immediate,”  “initiative,  original,
spontaneous, and free,” as well as “vivid and conscious” (EP 1: 248). There is no way to
describe adequately the felt experience of a First. In light of the initial felt quality of a
scientific explanation as a First, Peirce’s attempt at describing Adam on the first day of
being  conscious  is  apt:  “first,  present,  immediate,  fresh,  new,  initiative,  original,
spontaneous,  free,  vivid,  conscious,  and  evanescent.  Only,  remember  that  every
description  of  it  must  be  false  to  it”  (EP  1:  248).  In  addition  to  the  firstness  that
constitutes scientific explanation in the creative moment of scientific apprehension, it is
concomitantly constituted by what Peirce called Second, or secondness. This is the feeling
of relation or reaction to the First, and the First is necessary for the Second to exist.
Regarding our experience of scientific explanation in that moment before recognition,
this reaction is one of engagement; the secondness of the situation indicates that we
contribute to the experience of the explanation when we come “knocking up against it”
(EP 1: 249). It is a moment of apprehension, in which an explanation is completed with
regard to our own previously incomplete situation. We feel the explanation fitting our
problem and solving it in its immediacy. The feeling of consummation at its fullest makes
the creative moment of scientific apprehension an aesthetic experience, which brings our
specific scientific inquiry to a close. What we are in the process of making during this
experience is what will be the Third, but this only occurs after this creative moment of
apprehension has passed. The Third will consist in the re-cognition of the experience and
our attempt to represent the scientific explanation as a functional tool that solves our felt
difficulty.  This  signifies  the  dissipation  of  aesthetically  experiencing  the  scientific
explanation through apprehension, returning to the instrumentality of comprehension.
20 We may find that we have had similar experiences with the same explanations as others,
but  the  feeling of  solution differs  between individuals,  and,  as  Peirce  indicates,  that
feeling can never be described adequately. It is common for scientists to reminisce and
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venerate scientific theories and explanations. One of the reasons that scientists do this is
because  they  have  experienced  creative  moments  of  scientific  apprehension,  which
returns  them  to  what  Dewey  described  as  “a  kind  of  innocence  of  the  totality  of
experience”  (LW  13:  364).  There  is  something  childlike  in  being  swept  away  in  an
explanation  as  we  aesthetically  experience  it.  Some  of  the  more  common  scientific
theories and explanations experienced this way are: Darwin’s theory of natural selection
as an explanation for the variation between species; DNA as an explanation for genetic
heredity; Quantum Theory as an explanation for why matter and energy behave in the
ways that they do. The explanations are what we often describe as ‘beautiful’ or ‘elegant,’
thus ascribing an aesthetic or emotional quality to them. By re-evaluating the aesthetic
experience of  scientific  explanations  against  the backdrop of  Dewey’s  conceptions  of
aesthetics  and  science,  combined  with  Peirce’s  categories,  we  can  account  for  that
creative moment of scientific apprehension in which a scientific explanation takes on the
quality  of  kalos,  or  sense  of  general  harmony.  This  is  surely  not  our  only  aesthetic
experience that is also scientific, but it is one that is important because it reinforces why
we continue to be scientific and helps address the question of how scientific explanations
inspire us creatively.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AMES V., (1953), “John Dewey as Aesthetician,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 12 (2),
145-68.
ANDERSON D., (1987), Creativity and the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Press.
BERNSTEIN R., (1961), “John Dewey’s Metaphysics of Experience,” The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1),
5-14.
DEWEY J., The Middle Works of J. Dewey, 1899-1924, ed. by J.A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University
Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1976-1983.
DEWEY J., The Later Works of J. Dewey, 1925-1953, ed. by J.A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University
Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1981-1990.
GODFREY-SMITH P., (2002), “Dewey on Naturalism, Realism and Science,” Philosophy of Science, 69
(S3), 525-35.
GÖTZ I., (1981), “On Defining Creativity,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 39 (3), 297-301.
HASKINS C., (1992), “Dewey’s Art as Experience: The Tension Between Aesthetics and
Aestheticisms,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 28 (2), 217-59.
HOCUTT M., (1962), “The Logical Foundations of Peirce’s Aesthetics,” The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism, 21 (2), 157-66.
JOHNSTON J., (2002), “John Dewey and the Role of Scientific Method in Aesthetic Experience,” 
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 21, 1-15.
MOUNCE H., (1997), The Two Pragmatisms: From Peirce to Rorty, London, Routledge.
The Creative Moment of Scientific Apprehension
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
9
PEIRCE C., The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings: Volume 1: 1867-1893, ed. by N. Houser.
and C. Kloesel, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992.
PEIRCE C., The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings: Volume 2: 1893-1913, ed. by N. Houser
and C. Kloesel, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1998.
PUGH K., & M. GIROD, (2007), “Science, Art, and Experience: Constructing a Science Pedagogy from
Dewey’s Aesthetics,” Journal of Science Teacher Education, 18, 9-27.
SHORT T., (2007), Peirce’s Theory of Signs, New York, Cambridge University Press.
WAKS L., (1981), “Experimentalism and the Flow of Experience,” Educational Theory, 1 (47), 1-19.
NOTES
1. Doug Anderson has given an extensive analysis of creativity and the work of Peirce. However, I
disagree  with  the  distinction  between  the  “final  looks”  of  artistic  creativity  and  scientific
discovery (Anderson 1987: 54). In this particular paper, the argument is not one directly aimed at
this distinction, and is thus here outside the scope of my analysis. In addition, I agree with both
Max Hocutt 1962 and C.M. Smith 1972 that Peirce, as he admitted, never adequately developed an
aesthetics. Dewey provides a much better conception of aesthetic experience with which to work,
especially with regard to scientific explanation.
2. I take issue with Godfrey-Smith’s use of the term ‘disinterested’ here. Although Dewey claims
that  most  scientific  practice  consists  in  secondary  experience  with  regard  to  analyzing  and
synthesizing what has occurred within primary experience, I think he would find it difficult to
accept that scientists would bother to inquire into experience if they were disinterested in that
experience.
3. Here Peirce provides what I believe is sorely lacking in Dewey, categorical divisions by which
to understand experience. Although Dewey’s conceptions of primary and secondary experience
are useful, especially with regard to broad types of experience (emotive, intellectual, aesthetic),
Peirce’s  categories  are  much  more  useful  for  understanding  the  relationships  within  those
experiences. Here I only briefly touch upon how these categories relate to the creative moment
of  scientific  apprehension,  acknowledging that  further  work on this  particular  aspect  of  the
phenomenon would prove beneficial to our understanding.
ABSTRACTS
Scientific explanation is both instrumental and consummatory. When we experience scientific
explanation in its consummation, we experience what I have deemed a creative moment of scientific
apprehension,  which is an important aspect of creativity that comes at the end of inquiry and
contributes to the development of future inquiry. Because scientific explanation is commonly
cleaved from aesthetic experience, this moment of creativity has been neglected in both analyses
of  scientific  practice  and  analyses  of  aesthetic  experience.  By  synthesizing  John  Dewey’s
conceptions of scientific explanation and aesthetic experience with Charles S. Peirce’s categories,
this  moment  of  scientific  inquiry  is  revealed  and  understood  as  a  fundamental  part  of  our
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creative reasoning process. In order to argue that scientific explanation is both instrumental and
consummatory,  Dewey’s  instrumental  conception of  scientific  explanation is  provided,  which
includes why science is so often considered as separated from aesthetic experience. A general
overview of  Dewey’s  conception of  aesthetic  experience and the common division conceived
between scientific experience and that of aesthetics is also provided. Reasons are then supplied
to reconsider scientific experience as having an aesthetic dimension, especially with regard to
scientific explanations and the creative moment of scientific apprehension, which is followed by
a brief discussion concerning how recognition of this moment reveals an important aspect of
creative reasoning that is  to be understood as a part of our experience through what Peirce
referred  to  as  firstness  and  secondness.  Analyzing  the aesthetic  experience  of  scientific
explanations against the backdrop of Dewey’s conceptions of aesthetics and science, combined
with Peirce’s categories, accounts for that creative moment of scientific apprehension in which a
scientific explanation takes on the quality of kalos, or sense of general harmony, that inspires
reverie and future inquiry.
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